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This study investigates the impact of corporate governance on asset quality of Islamic 
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from 2008 to 2017. The study shows that asset quality of Islamic banks is positively and 
significantly sensitive to an increase in board independence, Shariah board, and audit 
committee effectiveness. The study finds that female participation in management as 
CEOs seems to detract from good performance and that more board meetings can 
be harnessed to improve banks’ asset quality. These empirical findings have practical 
policy implications regarding asset quality management and board construction 
within the Islamic banking sector. 
Article history:
Received : June 08, 2020
Revised : December 18, 2020
Accepted : January 04, 2021
Available online : June 30, 2021
https://doi.org/10.21098/bemp.v24i2.1344
Keywords: Corporate governance; 2SYS-GMM; Loan to assets; Loan to deposit; Non-
performing loans; OIC countries. 
JEL Classifications: G18; G21; G34; H81.
ABSTRACT
Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Volume 24, Number 2, 2021222
I. INTRODUCTION 
The dynamic challenge of corporate governance and its relation to performance 
have attained ever-growing popularity during the two decades (Aslam and Haron, 
2020). A fundamental limitation of this comprehensive literature is an inability to 
portray how professional and social correspondence between board individuals 
affect the capacity of board members to perform their obligations and to avoid 
corporate scandals. Corporate scandals have an impact on both the investor’s 
certainty and economic recessions, and hence highlight the utmost significance 
of corporate governance across firms (Nomran and Haron, 2020) and the banking 
sector. A delicate corporate governance system and extreme risk-taking exposures 
enhance the banking sector unsteadiness and economic losses; this reinforces the 
need for effective corporate governance practices in the banking sector (Aslam 
and Haron, 2020b). Rehman et al. (2020) discussed that a board demanding a good 
governance structure could send a positive signal to the market as well as provide 
good advice to management, which could significantly contribute to sustainable 
banking performance through strategic decision-making leads. 
Likewise, corporate governance and asset quality in the banking sector have 
recently received extraordinary attention from enterprises, governments and 
worldwide associations, especially in the aftermath of the global financial crisis 
of 2007/2008 (Chazi et al., 2018). Noteworthy, the conventional banking sector 
has been negatively impacted by the financial crisis, whereas the Islamic banking 
sector has remained stable and less vulnerable due its unique structure.1 Despite 
the exponential growth of Islamic banks, they face challenges of assets deficiency 
(Fiador and Sarpong-Kumankoma, 2020). Thus, it is the failure of management to 
antagonistic for any bank to deploy their assets within the pre-defined timeframe 
(Ahamed, 2017). Therefore, bank loans are viewed as an advantage for banks; 
however, the presence of non-performing loans will disintegrate the nature of 
the benefits of bank loans. Non-performing loans create adverse liquidity effects, 
which in turn distress the banks’, particularly reducing their future profits. Thus, 
a bank’s asset quality is one of the imperative measures used in deciding the well-
being of the bank (Aspiranti and Amaliah, 2019).
The rapid growth of the Islamic financial industry has spurred scholarly 
interest in the issue of asset quality in Islamic banks (Naushad and Malik, 2015). 
The Islamic banking industry faces more competition. This intense competition 
turns into the primary driver of the development and steadiness of banks in the 
Islamic banking industry (Ahamed, 2017). In line with this reasoning, a challenge 
for the boards of Islamic banks is ensuring that all their banks’ operations are 
compliant with Shariah law (prohibition of interest, gambling, and excessive risk); 
in attempts to be Sharia law compliant, Islamic banks experience decreasing asset 
efficiency (Ahmad et al., 2018; Chazi et al., 2018). John et al. (2016) recommend 
future research to explore the role of directors’/boards’ in promoting asset quality 
of the banking sector. This study is motivated to fill this research gap in the 
literature and to offers an enhanced understanding regarding the role of directors/
boards in the Islamic banks’ asset quality. Our study draws on the insights of 
1 Juhro et al. (2020) outline some unique features of Islamic stocks (issued by banks and non-banks) 
that make them resilient to shocks.
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the ‘resource dependence theory’ and argues that Islamic banks can sustain their 
asset quality through good corporate governance structure because boardroom 
capabilities (important information, aptitude, and skill) and a better capacity 
to relieve the competitive uncertainties maintain sound loan profiles in Islamic 
banks. Specifically, good corporate governance fosters national and international 
trust of the customers and community, which is an indispensable requisite for the 
development of Islamic banks. 
This study has several contributions. First, the evidence put forth by this 
study contributes to the literature on both corporate governance and banking by 
proposing an efficient board mechanism to enhance the banks’ ability to improve 
their asset quality. Second, this study controls for unobserved endogeneity and 
heterogeneity, which were missed by the large portion of the literature. Third, we 
examine how effective the dual board structure in Islamic banks is, by estimating 
the statistical significance of the interaction term between the regular board of 
directors and Sharia board on the asset quality of Islamic banks. Lastly, as opposed 
to prior studies, this study examines how bank risk varies across four different 
continents by using diverse and updated data concerning Europe and Central 
Asia, Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC), non-GCC Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA), East Asia and Pacific, and South Asia. This permits our study to assess 
whether disparities in the cross-regional regulatory frameworks, legal systems, 
and Islamic banking practices lead to disparities in risk-taking behaviour between 
and conventional and Islamic banks.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section II shows some of the 
leading measures of corporate governance along with the hypothesis. Section III 
presents the data and methodology of the study. Section IV presents the results 
on the relationship of corporate governance and asset quality of Islamic banks. 
Finally, Section V concludes. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. Asset Quality of Banks 
A steady banking system is essential for effective financial intermediation. Banks 
are dissimilar to assembling organizations; they sell credit and make a profit 
on their credit (advances). Thus, loans and advances are considered significant 
resources possessed by banks. Islamic banks’ financing and advances in the form 
of sale, partnership, trade, and services are subject to Shariah compliance (Ahmad 
et al., 2018; Aslam and Haron, 2020). Therefore, there is a dire need for the banking 
sector to adequately oversee their (Islamic banks) financing (loans) to achieve 
its core objectives (Fiador and Sarpong-Kumankoma, 2020). As banks keep on 
financing, they are consistently susceptible to the risk of default from borrowers 
(Abdulazeez et al., 2019). 
Several previous studies discussed asset quality in different dimensions. The 
study of Chazi et al. (2018) explored the core risks faced by banks, investors, and 
clients due to loan default. Several of the past studies identify the vital measures of 
banks’ asset quality, which include: loan to deposit, loan to assets, non-performing 
loans to net loans, and non-performing loan to assets (Abdulazeez et al., 2019; 
Fakhrunnas and Ramly, 2017; Tarchouna et al., 2017). According to Abdulazeez et 
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al. (2019), for better asset quality, banks should maintain the loan to deposit ratio 
below 85%, and non-performing loan to net loans below 5%. Moreover, Fiador and 
Sarpong-Kumankoma (2020) explained that banks with better asset quality have a 
low ratio of loans to total loans. Tarchouna et al. (2017) show that banks with a high 
ratio of loans to total assets take more risk to generate profit. 
B. Corporate Governance and Asset Quality of Banks
Prior studies demonstrated that corporate governance is an essential determinant 
of financial performance and firm outcomes (Abdulazeez et al., 2019). Additionally, 
governance also entails frameworks and structures to lessen the issue of agency 
problems emerging among investors and the board of an organization (Ahamed, 
2017). At the bank level, we expect that banks with better board structure will 
make better decisions, which will boost the banks’ wealth. Thus, the viability of 
a board in executing its managerial obligations is affected by some other board 
features to a great extent. These features are board-related such as independence, 
size, committees, gender, qualification, meetings, and Shariah board (Aslam et 
al., 2019; John et al., 2016). In view of the current interests of banks, this study 
analyses the role of board independence, board size, CEO duality, Shariah board, 
and audit committee in improving the asset quality of Islamic banks. Therefore, 
our discussion primarily explores the following factors.
B1. Board Size
Aslam and Haron (2020b) explained that the board size (executives) of an 
organization forms the board’s structure. Prior studies discussed the right and 
optimal board size in an organization, but this remains elusive. Organizations 
ascertained their ideal board size according to the trade-off among expenses 
and advantages for a larger and smaller board. Some firms accomplish better 
with larger boards since they face complications and require the advisory role 
of professional boards (Chazi et al., 2018; Mollah et al., 2017). Naushad and Malik 
(2015) documented that larger boards might be valuably possessing a vast array 
of knowledge, aptitudes, experience, and the expertise to advise the management 
to make better decisions in the interest of firms. Some earlier studies reported that 
smaller boards are valuable because larger boards have unreasonable control over 
CEOs and obstruct the adequacy of their decision making (Farag et al., 2018). Chazi 
et al. (2018) reported that a large board size does not just expand board cost, board 
repetition, and the issue of free-riding from inept board individuals, it creates 
additionally pointless board debates emerging from contradictions. Considering 
the conclusions of prior studies, we deduct that Islamic bank required a larger 
board to make efficient strategic decisions in a competitive environment. Thus, we 
formulate the following hypothesis:
H1: Larger boards exert a positive effect on the asset quality of Islamic banks. 
B2. Board Independence
Board independence is a significant component of board composition, measured 
as the total outside directors share in the board (Tarchouna et al., 2017). Farag et al. 
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(2018) documented that non-executive directors provided more effectual advisory 
and monitoring role that is unavailable within the organization. Tarchouna et al. 
(2017) found that organizations possessed higher asset quality because of active 
monitoring role of outside directors. Moreover, Wang et al. (2012) stated that board 
independence has a positive and significant effect on the asset quality of the US 
bank holding companies. Hence, Almutairi and Quttainah (2017) documented that 
outside directors are less compelling for observance being subject to the CEO for 
their career growth. Mollah et al. (2017) pointed out that non-executive directors 
help to encourage the exchange of data between the management and directors. 
A high proportion of outside directors could, thus, weaken the performance of 
the advisory tasks in the organization (Aslam, and Haron, 2020b). Tarchouna et 
al. (2017) additionally found a noteworthy negative connection between board 
independence and non-performing loans. Their outcomes are consistent with 
those of Japanese insider-ruled corporate administration highlights. Thus, the 
study of Aslam and Haron (2020b) found that board independence is primarily 
related to banking industry using data from several OECD countries. This study 
hypothesises that the Islamic financial industry utilises board independence 
effectively. This hypothesis is stated as follows.
H2: Board independence exerts a positive effect on the asset quality of Islamic banks. 
B3. CEO Duality
CEO duality exists when the CEO of an association additionally serves or acts 
as the chairman of the board (Grassa and Matoussi, 2014). In this manner, the 
CEO wields absolute power and supremacy over all corporate decisions. Thus, 
separating the roles of the CEO and the Chairman will improve responsibility, as 
the autonomous board will fill in to keep an eye on the activities and decisions of 
the firm through joint participation thereby guaranteeing that investors’ interest 
is very much ensured (Al-Malkawi and Pillai, 2018). Nguyen et al. (2015) argued 
that board duality and partitioning of roles have their own merits and demerits. 
They also contended that combining the two positions will energize a substantial 
initiative and improve an organisation’s performance over the long haul. Similarly, 
Tarchouna et al. (2017) stated that in the presence of board duality and a strong 
executive, there exists an immediate connection between corporate proficiency 
and execution. In this spirit, we predict that board duality has a beneficial impact 
on the asset quality of the Islamic banks (Almutairi and Quttainah, 2017). Our 
hypothesis is formulated as follows.
H3: CEO duality exerts a positive effect on the asset quality of Islamic banks. 
B4. Audit Committee 
Audit committee is a standing committee of governance that is established to 
enhance the financial accountability, unwavering quality, and transparency in 
organisations, whereby the auditor and the management strengthen the financial 
reporting in the organizations according to the general accounting and legal 
standards (AlSagr et al., 2018). It also serves as a scaffold in the correspondence 
network among auditors and board of directors as well as enable them to adequately 
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check the power of the board with specific reference to the accounting standards 
(Rehman et al., 2021). Therefore, the Combined Code (2008) suggested that all listed 
organizations have a completely independent audit committee. Several studies 
found conflicting results by analysing the appropriate audit committee size and 
financial reporting (Al-Karasneh, 2018). For instance, Al-Malkawi and Pillai (2018) 
demonstrated that larger audit committees are bound to withstand pressures of 
management conspiracy and have the option to give more consideration to the 
overall financial accounting process. Thus, regulatory bodies also believe that 
audit committee size is a significant component of controlling the accounting 
process. Hence, the study of Alam and Haron (2020) reported that large size 
committees depend on a more extensive information base, changed aptitude, and 
subsequently attempt their job even more successfully. Along with this discussion, 
we believe that the audit committee plays a significant role in improving the asset 
quality of Islamic banks and hence we formulate our hypothesis as follows. 
H4: Larger audit committees exert a positive effect on the asset quality of Islamic banks. 
B5. Shariah Board
Islamic banks have double layer governance structure: the regular board of 
directors and Shariah board. The ordinary board perform like a regular bank 
board. Yet, it works under the two-tier governance structure—the regular board 
of directors inside the strict parameters set out by the Shariah board (Nomran and 
Haron, 2020). The job of the Shariah board is to implement and ensure Islamic 
standards at all levels of board and evaluating the performance Mollah et al. (2017). 
The Shariah board ensures great corporate governance for an Islamic bank. Thus, 
the primary function of the Shariah board to complies with all the transaction of 
Islamic banks in accordance with Islamic law and avoid the violation of Shariah. 
The resource dependence theory proposes that a larger Shariah board size brings 
diverse knowledge and experience, which enable the board to provide better 
quality guidance and counsel to the organizations (Rehman et al., 2021). Moreover, 
several studies stated that larger Shariah boards have professional knowledge and 
a good understanding of Islamic law that enable them to take better decisions to 
improve the banking efficiency (Mollah et al., 2017; Nomran and Haron, 2020). 
Accordingly, the study hypothesizes that: 
H5: Large Shariah board size exerts a positive effect on the asset quality of Islamic 
banks. 
III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
A. Data Collection Procedure 
The sample contains all listed Islamic banks in the Bankscope database spanning 
the period from 2008 to 2017. The internal governance-related data are collected 
from banks’ annual reports, which are openly available on their websites, and 
the financial data are obtained through the Bankscope database. Data on the 
macroeconomic variables are collected from the World Bank Indicators (WDI) 
database. We construct a balanced panel dataset and removed all those banks 
with missing accounting and governance data as well as those that are unalive 
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throughout the sample period. Moreover, we also eliminate all Islamic investment 
banks and Modarabah funds from the sampling frame. This procedure results in a 
balanced panel of 129 Islamic banks from 29 Organisation of Islamic Cooperation 
(OIC) countries, yielding 1290 observations, as shown in Table 1. 
Table 1.
Study Sample
This table shows the sample of Islamic banks from 29 OIC countries.





















21 Saudi Arabia 5
22 Senegal 1
23 Sudan 9
24 Syrian Arab Republic 1
25 Tunisia 1
26 United Arab Emirates 7
27 Turkey 4
28 West Bank and Gaza 2
29 Yemen 3
Total Sampled of Islamic Banks 129
B. The Variables 
In this study, we collected data on Loan to Assets (LAS), Loan To Deposit (LTD), and 
Non-Performing Loan to net loans (NPLR), which are recognized as the measures 
of banks’ asset quality in the literature (Al-Karasneh, 2018; Fakhrunnas and 
Ramly, 2017). The explanatory variables are Board Independence (BIND), Board 
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Size (BS), CEO Duality (CD), Shariah Board (SB), and Audit Committee (AUDC), 
following the previous research (Aslam and Haron, 2020a; Aslam et al., 2019). 
Control variables are bank-specific (market share, net profit, size, and leverage) 
and board features (gender and board meetings, and country-specific features 
(GDP and inflation) selected from previous studies on corporate governance 
and asset quality (Almutairi and Quttainah, 2017; Farag et al., 2018; Grassa and 
Matoussi, 2014; Mahmood et al., 2014; Mollah et al., 2017; Shabbir et al., 2020). Table 
2 summarizes all variables used in this study.
Table 2.
The Variables
This table describes the variables used in this study. These variables are divided into three categories. The first 
category has the corporate governance mechanism-related independent variables. The second category has asset 
quality-related dependent variables. The third category has the control variables, which is categorised into bank-
specific, board-specific, and macroeconomic variables. 
Variables Labels Definition
Corporate governance mechanisms (Independent variables)
Board Size BS Total number of members on the board
Board 
Independence BIND Total number of members of non-executive directors
CEO Duality CD If the CEO also holds chairman position, then the value is one and if not then the value is zero
Shariah Board SB Total number of members of Shariah Board
Audit Committee AUDC Total number of members in the audit committee
Bank asset quality indicators (Dependent variables)
Loan to assets LAS Ratio of average total loans to average total assets
Loan to deposit LTD Ratio of average total loans to average total customer deposits
Non-performing 
loan to net loans NPLR Ratio of non-performing loans to net loans
Bank characteristics (Control variables)
Bank Size BKS Natural log of total bank assets
Leverage LEV Proportion of total debt over equity
Net Profit NP Total revenue minus total expenses
Market Share MKS Share of assets of each bank to total banks’ assets
Foreign ownership FOWN A binary variable that takes the value of one if foreign firms have an ownership in the Islamic bank or zero otherwise
Board features (Control variables)
Gender GEND If the CEO is male the value is one and if the CEO is female, then the value is zero
Board Meetings BM Total number of board meetings
Macroeconomic features (Control variables)
Inflation CPI Natural log of the consumer price index
Country Growth GDP Natural log of total gross domestic product
C. Model Specification 
To address endogeneity and heterogeneity problems, the 2SYS-GMM estimator is 
employed and the following specifications are tested: 
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where i denotes the Islamic banks (i=1,...,129) and t denotes the years (t = 2008 
,⋯,2017). LAS is a loan to assets, LTD loan to deposit, NPLR is a non-performing 
loan to net loans indicator of the asset quality of Islamic banks. CG denotes the 
corporate governance variables. X indicates the control variables (gender, board 
meetings, market share, net profit, bank size, leverage, GDP, inflation) and  is the 
error term. Because the estimated standard errors using the 2SYS-GMM estimator 
can be bias downwards, we employ the finite sample correction for the variance-
covariance matrix proposed by Windmeijer (2005).
D. Descriptive Statistics 
Our preliminary descriptive analysis shows that the mean ratio of Loan to Assets 
(LAS) is approximately 50.4% and varies between 4.4% to 1020%.2 The mean 
of Loan To Deposit (LTD) is almost 418% and varies between 1.5% to 2051%. 
Additionally, the average of Non-Performing Loans to net loans (NPLR) is 403% 
and varies between 326% to 3176%. Concerning corporate governance, the average 
Board Size (BS) is 8.5 and varies between 5 to 21. Moreover, the average of Board 
Independence (BIND) is 4.5 and varies between 3 to 13. The mean value of the 
Shariah board is 3.71 and varies between 2 to 11. The average size of the audit 
committee is 3.46 and varies between 2 to 7. Moreover, the average size of CEO 
Duality, board meeting, gender is 0.17, 4, and 0.86, respectively. Turning to the 
bank and macroeconomic variables, the mean bank size, leverage, market share, 
net profit, GDP, and inflation, and foreign ownership are, respectively, 6.08, 7.06, 
2.06, 0.05, 27.91, 4.74, and 0.20. 
E. Correlation Statistics 
From the correlation analysis, we find that non-executive directors’ indicator 
has the highest correlation (0.69) with board size.3 Thus, none of the correlation 
coefficients exceeds 0.69; therefore, we conclude that collinearity between the 
variables is not a concern, as suggested by Gujarati (2009). Additionally, we find 
that the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) of all explanatory variables is less than 10. 
2  The full results are withheld but are available on request.
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Based on this, there is no concern of multi-collinearity among the regressors, as 
suggested by Wooldridge (2005).4
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Table 3 reports the results of the 2SYS-GMM estimation of the effect of corporate 
governance on Islamic banks’ asset quality in Equations (1) and (2). For each 
regression, the diagnostic test satisfies the condition that instruments are 
uncorrelated and that the error terms are different across models. In addition, 
the AR (1) and (2) test results show absence of autocorrelation problems across 
models, as suggested by the literature (Nomran and Haron, 2020; Aslam and 
Haron, 2020b). The lag values of LAS, LTD, and NPLR are positive and statistically 
significant in all models, indicating that the past year’s LAS, LTD, and NPLR 
values significantly enhance the current year’s LAS, LTD, and NPLR values of 
Islamic banks. 
Table 3 indicates that Board Size (BS)is negatively related to the loan to assets 
value of the Islamic banks. These results support the finding of Almutairi and 
Quttainah (2017): board size reduces asset quality of banks. Thus, the negative 
relationship might be because of Islamic banks’ directors who avoid taking 
excessive risk and avoid non-Shariah compliant investment. On the other hand, 
BS is positively related to the loan to deposit value of Islamic banks, in line with 
the finding of Abdulazeez et al. (2019) on Nigeria. This result indicates that a larger 
board enhances the Islamic banks’ asset quality measured in terms of LTD. Also, 
BS has a negative and significant relationship with Non-Performing Loan to net 
loans (NPLR) value of the Islamic banks, consistent with the findings of Tarchouna 
et al. (2017) in the USA. This result indicates that board size is characterized by 
diversified skills and experience, which enable them to reduce the ratio of non-
performing loans in Islamic banks. 
Board Independence (BIND) is positively related to the asset quality of Islamic 
banks measured in terms of LAS and LTD. The results support the argument 
put forward Chazi et al. (2018) that more independent boards improve the asset 
quality of banks. Thus, a more independent board is more competent and has 
diversified knowledge in utilizing assets properly and hence improves the wealth 
of Islamic banks. BIND is negatively related to NPLR, supporting the findings 
of Fakhrunnas and Ramly (2017) on Southeast Asian banks. This result signifies 
that board independence helps the Islamic banks to reduce their non-performing 
loans. CEO Duality (CD) is positively related to LAS and LTD, consistent with 
the findings of Al-Malkawi and Pillai (2018) on Qatar that CEO duality improves 
the asset quality of banks. Moreover, CD is negatively related to NPLR, which is 
similar to the findings of Grove et al. (2011) showing that CEO duality improves 
the asset value of banks. This result indicates that one manager has more power to 
make better decision to enhance the asset quality of Islamic banks. 
4  These results are also available on request.
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Table 3.
Impact of Corporate Governance on Asset Quality (2SYS-GMM)




***, **, and * represent, respectively, statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. AR (1) and (2) and Hansen 
test results are reported in parentheses.
Variable Model 1 Loan to assets
Model 2
 Loan to deposit
Model 3 
Non-performing 
loan to net loan
Loan to assets 0.0984***  
Loan to deposit 0.3228***
Non-performing loan to net loan 0.1473*** 
Board size -0.0539*** 0.6968*** -0.6225** 
Board Independence 0.0352*** 0.3468*** -1.5447*** 
CEO duality 0.1018** 9.1257*** -11.2518***
Shariah board 0.0411*** 1.1241*** -1.7584*** 
Audit committee 0.0931 2.2544*** -4.8889*** 
CEO gender 0.1060*** 2.6692*** -2.0594* 
Board meeting 0.0019** 1.2133*** 0.0021*
Bank size -0.0183*** 0.1857 -0.2834
Leverage 0.0091*** -0.0527* -0.0925
Net profit -0.0187*** -0.3664*** 1.0287*** 
Market share 0.6384*** 7.1486*** -23.4225***
Foreign ownership 0.2597*** 8.2465*** -13.4985*** 
Inflation -0.0161*** -0.4425*** -0.3553
GDP 0.0124* 1.6073*** 0.3939
Constant 0.0548*** 0.76005*** -0.9007***
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes
Crisis dummy Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1165 1165 1171
Number of Individuals 129 129 129
Number of Instruments 8 9 9
AR (1) test statistics (p-value) 0.1728 0.0749 0.3025
AR (2) test statistics (p-value) 0.2513 0.2405 0.3782
Hansen test (p-value) 0.3718 0.2665 0.6494
Shariah Board (SB) is positively related to LAS and LTD. These results support 
the finding of Naushad and Malik (2015) that larger Shariah boards improve 
the asset quality of Islamic banks. Moreover, SB is negatively related to NPLR, 
supporting the findings of Fakhrunnas and Ramly (2017) for Southeast Asian 
Islamic banks. Thus, the present results signify that SB fosters a positive managerial 
behaviour to improve the asset quality of Islamic banks by offering additional 
support to boards. On the other hand, AUDC is positively associated with LTD but 
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is not associated with LAS. These results support theoretical arguments and are 
similar to the finding of Wang et al. (2012) and Tarchouna et al. (2017) for the USA. 
The present findings indicate that large audit committee size helps the Islamic 
banks to reduce their non-performing loans. Moreover, these are consistent with 
the resource dependence theory that large independence audit committees have 
the latitude of making informed decisions, detecting errors and can easily facilitate 
effective work and provide unbiased judgment, resulting in improved asset quality 
of Islamic banks. 
For the control variables, we observe that gender is positively related to LAS 
and LTD but negatively associated with NPLR. These results support the finding 
of Grassa and Matoussi (2014) that male CEOs have a beneficial effect on the 
asset quality of the banks. Board meetings are positively related to LAS and LTD, 
consistent with Aslam and Haron (2020a) that more board meetings improve 
the value of Islamic banks. Bank size is negatively associated with LAS, which 
contradicts evidence in Abdulazeez et al. (2019). This result indicates that as the 
size of the bank increases, the size of non-performing loans increases and in turn 
deteriorates asset quality of the Islamic banks. Leverage is negatively related to 
LAS and LTD suggesting that a high ratio of debt has a detrimental effect on the 
asset quality of Islamic banks, consistent with Aslam and Haron (2020b) that more 
debt decreases the performance of Islamic banks. 
Net profit has a negative relation with LAS and LTD but a positive one with 
NPLR. These results imply that an increase in profit decreases the asset quality of 
Islamic banks. One of the possible reasons for this reduction effect of an increase in 
profit on asset quality is that an increase in bank lending simultaneously increases 
profit and the ratio of bad debt. Market share is positively associated with LAS and 
LTD, but is negatively related to NPLR. These results indicate that a large share of 
Islamic banks in the market enhances the asset quality of Islamic banks, consistent 
with the finding of Aslam and Haron (2020a) in OIC countries. Foreign ownership 
is positively associated with LAS and LTD, which supports the finding of Aslam 
and Haron, (2020) that, in the presence of foreign ownership, banks perform more 
efficiently and thus have better asset quality of Islamic banks. Inflation carries a 
negative relation with LAS and LTD indicating that high inflation decreases the 
asset quality of Islamic banks because people are unable to pay their debt. GDP 
positively impacts LAS and LTD, consistent with Mollah et al. (2017). 
V. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
In this section, we estimate our models using the one-step first-difference 
Generalized Method of Moments (difference GMM) estimator to investigate the 
robustness of our results in Table 65. We find that the coefficients of other CG 
variables, including board size, board independence, CEO duality are unchanged, 
in terms of direction and magnitude. All the asset quality lag variables, namely 
LAS, LTD, and NPLR, have a positive effect on the performance of Islamic banks, 
similar to the estimates in Table 3. The coefficients of the control variables in this 
case have similar directions and significance as those reported in Table 3. 
5  These estimates are available on request.
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VI. CONCLUSION 
There is an ongoing debate regarding the role of corporate governance in improving 
the value of corporations, especially after the global financial crisis of 2008. Weak 
corporate governance in the financial sector was deemed as the principal root of 
the global financial crisis of 2008, and this corporate governance weakness is not 
limited to the commercial banks—it extends to Islamic banks as well. Therefore, 
this study adds to the debate about the significant role of corporate governance 
in improving the asset quality in Islamic banks by using a panel dataset of 129 
Islamic banks operating in 29 OIC countries spanning 2008 to 2017. Based on the 
2SYS-GMM estimator, we find that the lag values of loan to assets, loan to deposit, 
and non-performing loans to net loans have a positive and significant effect on the 
present values of loan to assets, loan to deposits, and non-performing loans to net 
loans of Islamic banks. We find that board independence, Shariah board, and audit 
committee play a significant role in enhancing the asset quality of Islamic banks. 
Still, board size and CEO duality have effects on the asset quality of Islamic banks. 
Thus, the findings indicate that reliable corporate governance mechanisms play a 
pivotal role in enhancing the asset quality of the Islamic banks.
Sequel to the present empirical evidence, this study would help the banks in 
developing appropriate strategies to improve their asset quality. In essence, larger 
board sizes may be beneficial to Islamic banks if they are motivated to utilize 
their services and their expertise to add value. It is also imperative that the board 
independence would ensure the effective monitoring of the activities of the board, 
specifically concerning the credit department. Audit committee and Shariah board 
can foster positive managerial behaviours and asset quality of Islamic banks 
by offering additional support to the boards. They also increase the reliability, 
credibility, and legitimacy of Islamic banks, which boost the confidence of the 
investors, and as a result, improve banks’ value. Moreover, male as CEOs take 
more reliable decisions than females, according to the results. This means, in some 
sense, that the role of female CEOs requires further investigation to map out the 
part of gender in the Islamic banking sector. Finally, more board meetings enhance 
the asset value of banks by efficiently monitoring the credit-related operation in 
the banks. 
This study encourages the policymakers, regulators, and practitioners of 
Islamic banks to adopt effective governance mechanism to boost the asset quality 
of the Islamic banking industry. 
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